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The sources of early modern honour
The origins of the early modern concept of honour, in England and elsewhere 
in Western Europe, have to be traced as far back as the ninth century B.C. in 
Ancient Greece. As Werner Jaeger demonstrated in his seminal Paideia (Jaeger 
1945: 15–30), the aristocratic society depicted in Homer’s narrations produced 
a heavily ideologized narrative that we will still recognize as ‘honour’ almost 
2500 years later. Indeed, the Ancient Greek term aretē could be considered as 
the most closely related pre-text of early modern puritan ‘virtue’ (although, un-
like the latter, not restricted to the moral sense) and ultimately as the guiding 
idea behind early modern honour. Greek aretē is the expression of the high-
est knightly ideal, and it includes the related notions of refined conduct and 
military heroism (Jaeger 1945: 3); in this sense it is also restricted to male 25
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aristocrats. An honourable conduct, then, meant for the aristocratic warrior of 
Ancient Greece an attempt, or the expression of an attempt, to achieve aretē, 
with the purpose of being praised by his peers, that is, people of prestige. In 
short, aretē stressed the importance of external opinion (i.e., it was conferred 
from outside), it was based on military feats and it was naturally connected 
with the aristocracy; in general terms, it was from this concept that a more rec-
ognizable idea of honour developed thorough the Middle Ages and eventually 
emerged in the sixteenth century. 
Before it turned into our recognizable early modern concept of honour, this 
term had to undergo important transformations through the medieval period 
and beyond; namely, it included moral and ethical values, and overflowed its 
aristocratic origins to become a wider notion (Jaeger 1945: 24). This complex 
set of meanings, more readily differentiated by moralists of the sixteenth century 
in Western Europe than by Homer, was known as aidōs in Ancient Greece. The 
English stock translation of aidōs is ‘shame’, and, to be sure, both terms share 
certain features: both imply being exposed to the gaze of the other, both may 
provoke physical reactions (blushes, aggressions), and both are attended by cer-
tain patterns of behaviour of a ritualistic kind (averting the gaze, hiding, bowing 
the head etc...) (Cairns 1993: 1–26). However, and on a psychological level, they 
are not coextensive: whereas ‘shame’ in English seems to be related to the nega-
tive implications of the disapproval of others and the consequent fear of exter-
nal sanctions, aidōs is more positively involved in the set of recommendations 
and constraints that one has to follow in his arrangements with others. Thus, 
the meanings of the etymologically associated Greek verb aideomai may include: 
‘I feel shame before’, ‘I respect’ or ‘I am abashed’. Aidōs, then, is an aggregate of 
different meanings that will be retaken later by moralists of the English sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries: embarrassment, shame and guilt, honour, and reputa-
tion; and, consequently, dishonour, contumelia and the aphilotimon.1 This set of 
concepts, significantly similar to those applied to the expected and prescribed 
behaviour of the early modern man, can only be covered, although partially, by 
what I will be calling the early modern ‘code/concept of honour’. 
1  Contumelia  (Latin) was for the Ancients equivalent to early modern dishonour, and the 
aphilotimos was the man for whom honour was not a guiding principle: consequently, a 
dishonoured man.26
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Aristotle is the first advocator of the concept of honour directly influential 
in the English Renaissance.2 As a moralist, he provided aretē (so far, as we just 
saw, a form of amoral virtue) with some axiological (ethical) content; thus, the 
new Aristotelian virtue, which designates a manly quality and refers primar-
ily to valour and justice, includes intellectual (wisdom, intelligence and pru-
dence) and ethical (liberality and moderation) components. Moral virtues, for 
Aristotle, are the outcome of habit, and their essential quality is moderation, 
or mediocrity: a middle state which lies between the vice of excess and the vice 
of deficiency. In his Eudemian Ethics (fourth c. BC) he postulates that moral 
virtue has to do with the personal selection of mediocrity (Aristotle 1971: II, 
10). This concept (the golden mean) will become a guiding principle of the ap-
proaches to honour and virtue by Aristotle, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius and most 
of our early modern moralists, as we will see. Aristotle defines honour in the 
Nichomachean Ethics (fourth c. BC) as “the reward of virtue” (Aristotle 1970: 
I, 5), meaning by virtue a certain habit of moral excellence whose prize is con-
ferred by your peers. In this sense, it is clear from these ideas that since honour 
is the reward of moral goodness, it must be subordinated to virtue. According 
to Aristotle, confusion arises from considering honour as equal to happiness, 
the foundation of virtue, since honour depends on those who bestow it, and 
this is not appropriated to happiness (Aristotle 1970: I, 5). 
Some centuries later, Cicero goes even further in this relation of virtue and 
honour. He establishes a close link between the “four cardinal virtues” and 
honour or, in this case, honesty, making honest conduct stem directly from 
adherence to one of the four virtues (Cicero 1976: II, 20). Cicero’s honestas 
resembles Aristotle’s honour in its relation to virtue; in any case, Cicero doesn’t 
seem consistent in his use of this term and will change to ‘honour’, ‘fame’ or 
‘glory’ in different contexts. In his elaboration, to be free from vices will also be 
a prerequisite to be honoured or admired by others (Cicero 1976: II, 10). Like-
wise, Cicero also accepts and recognizes the importance of a good reputation; 
he is careful to indicate that it shouldn’t be a man’s main concern, but at the 
same time he postulates men’s subordination to higher entities, such as coun-
try and fellow countrymen. This is certainly one of the first references that 
clearly implies some kind of ideological appropriation or manipulation in order 
to inoculate an important degree of conformism with the status quo; the pro-
cess involved is what some authors have identified as the turning of dangerous 
2  I am aware that neither Aristotle’s nor Plato’s agent-centred moral theories exactly re-
produce popular Ancient Greek morality, but to discriminate, at this level, that differ-
ence would imply a sophisticated philosophical analysis which is out of the scope of this 
article. See Annas 1981; see also Irwin 1985.27
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(stoic) self-sufficiency into acceptable self-discipline (Chew 1988: 2), or as the 
consequence of what Mervyn James called “the moralization of politics” in the 
early modern period (1978: 413). These elements, the inextricable association 
of honour and virtue and the acceptance of the public, or social, dimension of 
honour (that is, reputation) is what relates Cicero to Aristotle in a historically 
ongoing discussion about the evolving notion of honour.
Interestingly, moral philosophy of the early modern period is more close-
ly related to the ethical writing of, basically, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics 
(fourth c. BC) and Cicero’s De Officiis (first c. BC) than it is to the medieval 
thought of Aquinas or Ockham. Apart from those two seminal references, the 
English moralist of this period used to make frequent allusion to Plato’s Repub-
lic (fourth c. BC), Aristotle’s Rhetoric and – to a lesser extent – his Eudemian 
Ethics, Cicero’s De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations 
(second c.), Seneca’s Moral Essays and Moral Epistles (first c.), Epictetus’ En-
cheiridion (first-second c.), and finally, as any reader of Shakespeare knows, 
Plutarch’s Lives (first c.). The enormous influence of these works during the 
English early modern period, not always read directly but mediated through 
the translation, and frequently the interpretation and even editing of other 
authors (as was very famously the case with Plutarch), can be easily found in 
a number of well-known early modern treatises, such as Thomas Elyot’s The 
Boke Named the Gouernor (1531), a seminal moral essay which was clearly (and 
admittedly) following Aristotle and Cicero; or Antonio de Guevara’s Diall of 
Princes (1529), a compilation of moral teachings mostly lifted from the Medita-
tions of Marcus Aurelius3. 
Other essayists of the period, directly indebted to classical definitions of 
ethics and morality, include Count Romei’s The Courtier’s Academie (1598), 
Lodowycke Bryskett’s A Discourse of Civill Life (1606), and John Cleland’s The 
Institution of a Young Nobleman (1607). This concern with moral behaviour, 
combined with a similar reliance on classical sources, produced a sustained in-
terest in the allegedly single most influential and complex code of conduct of 
the whole early modern period, namely, the concept of honour. Consequently, 
several treatises and pamphlets by various scholars tried to guide the Tudor 
and Jacobean subject between the Scylla and Charybdis of an excessive and 
defective concern with reputation, fame, glory and the many different forms 
that honour adopted. Thus, works such as William Segar’s The Booke of Honor 
and Armes (1590), John Norden’s The Mirror of Honor (1597), Thomas Milles’ 
The Catalogue of Honour (1610), Gervase Markham’s Honour in his Perfection 
3  Originally published in Spanish in 1529, it was translated into English by Thomas 
North in 1557.28
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(1624), Francis Markham’s The Booke of Honour (1625), and, above all, the 
Aris totelian Robert Ashley’s Of honour (1600), all of them testify, in their own 
various ways, to a sustained concern with honour as a code of conduct heavily 
influencing not only the writing of the period (from Sidney’s Arcadia to Shake-
speare’s Othello) but also the life and politics of the Tudor and Stuart eras (from 
the Pilgrimage of Grace or Sidney’s death at Zutphen to Puritan derogatory 
depictions of Cavaliers as the epitome of vainglory). 
Lotman and the typology of culture
The Russian-Estonian semiotician Yuri Lotman put, in the 1970s, the basis 
for a theory of culture which, although, to a certain extent, remained unfin-
ished, was part of a wider cultural semiotic paradigm that, later – in the 1980s 
and early 1990s –, would develop into Lotman’s related theories of the semio-
sphere and of culture as explosion.4 In Stat’i po tipologii kul’tury (The Problem 
of Sign and of Sign Systems in the Typology of Russian Culture before the Twen-
tieth Century)5 Lotman identified four different modes of culture which, he 
suggested, characterize four historical and cultural periods: the Middle Ages, 
the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and Romanticism. These periods, Lot-
man claimed, work semiotically as cultural artifacts, or ‘sign systems’, which 
for Lotman means that they can be semiotically defined through the functions 
performed by signs (linguistic and otherwise) in the symbolic construction of 
reality operated by them. The four different cultural modes, or historical and 
cultural periods, that he describes through this theory are then characterized 
both synchronically and diachronically as the product of the combination of 
the paradigmatic – or symbolic – and syntagmatic – or relational – dimensions 
of the sign. Given that for Lotman language is the primary modelling system 
of a culture, it is not surprising that this theory puts the sign, especially in its 
linguistic function, at the centre of his typology of culture; however, he does 
not dismiss the influence of secondary modelling systems (like literature or 
painting) in the characterization of these periods.
4  For an approach in English to some of his most relevant work, see On the Semiotic 
Mechanism of Culture (1978), The Text within the Text (1994), and Universe of the Mind 
(2001). However, Lotman’s work, originally published in Russian and Estonian, is al-
most fully translated into Italian and Spanish. See the collection La semiosfera (in three 
volumes), edited by Lotmanian scholar and translator Desiderio Navarro. 
5  I will be following the Spanish translation by N. Méndez: “El problema del signo y del 
sistema sígnico en la tipología de la cultura anterior al siglo XX”.29
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As we have suggested above, and according to his approach, the whole sys-
tem revolves around the basic functioning of the sign, which could be described 
as metaphoric and metonymic, or – as already mentioned – paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic. The former deals with the referential or symbolic (substituting) 
function of the sign, what it represents or stands for, in a similar way to how 
metaphors work in literary writing. Anglo-Saxon medieval poetry was based 
on a symbolic, paradigmatic, mode of culture, as the metaphoric use of ken-
ning suggests, or as the various symbols structuring poems such as The Dream 
of the Rood (seventh-eighth c.) or The Wanderer (eighth-ninth c.) show; Chau-
cer’s opening of the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales (ca. 1380), with 
its explicit allusion to the connections between the renewal of life in Spring 
and the renewal of the soul through the pilgrimage, is another clear example of 
this. The second function is the relational, or syntagmatic, one, and it is based 
on the relationships that the sign establishes with other signs, its syntagmatic 
(relational) connections. A part-for-the-whole relationship, of a metonymic 
kind, is the one that most clearly exemplifies this kind of sign function, and we 
clearly find it in the so-called ‘absent presence/present absence of the lady’ of 
the Elizabethan sonnet. 
 From a diachronic perspective, through the combination of these two 
functions – the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic ones – Lotman produces 
four different modes of culture, depending on these four possibilities: the ab-
sence of the two functions, the presence of both, or the alternate absence and 
presence of one and the other. Thus, Lotman characterizes the medieval peri-
od as one in which only the paradigmatic function is present, and consequently 
he describes it as building a symbolic model of the world, whereas the early 
modern period, the one in which the relational function is central, projects a 
syntagmatic one. Lotman’s model is not at all a fixed, static or harmonious one, 
since the dynamics of the codes, and the contrast between the set of codes be-
longing to text and reader, prevents such kind of stasis; besides, texts in his 
typology of culture appear as composite, complex and full of contradiction, 
issues which through his theory can be appropriately addressed. 
However, in some cases it could be argued that Lotman did not develop 
in full detail what the nature of the relations between these two models, para-
digmatic and syntagmatic, in the moment of transition from one period to the 
next, was, and – more to the point – Lotman’s model may appear at times to rely 
too heavily on a somewhat static view of history, one in which different periods 
occasionally seem to be characterized by one single and relatively unconflic-
tive mode of culture. In this sense Raymond Williams’ own formulation about 
culture as a constant negotiation between residual, emergent and dominant 
forms appears to be helpful in order to overcome that shortcoming, helping 30
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to envisage this relation as one of conflict between the residual medieval-sym-
bolic and the emergent early modern-paradigmatic modes, with the transition 
itself as the dominant mode in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centu-
ries (Williams 1977: 121–27; 1980: 35–45).6 Williams, then, completes Lot-
man’s model by providing a perception of each period – while characterized 
by a specific sign system and the absence of another – as full of contradictory 
relationships in the interplay of his three forms of culture. Lotman’s typology 
of cultures, complemented with Williams’, seems to provide a solid basis to 
analyze the functioning of honour, and the clash of epistemic and ideological 
models that conditioned its development during the early modern period. 
Honour in the early modern period
Honour in sixteenth and seventeenth century England functioned as one form 
of symbolic production of meaning and value, in much the same way as money, 
in its different forms (coins, plate money, paper money), did. According to Lot-
man, and as we just saw, we witness a transition from a medieval (symbolic and 
paradigmatic) model to an early modern (relational, syntagmatic) one; if the 
former is based on the belief in the essence of things, the latter relies on the 
value of change, which is evidently relational. In Max Weber’s classic formula-
tion, the medieval episteme is based on the reciprocity nexus, which entails 
among other things a lack of political centrality and the legitimation of history 
by reference to a higher, transcendent, reality.7 In Lotman’s words:
The importance of the sign lay in its substitution function: the substituted ele-
ment was considered as content and the substituting element as expression. 
For this reason the substituting element could never have an autonomous val-
ue: it acquired value according to the hierarchic position of its content in the 
general model of the world. (Quoted in Serpieri 1991: 125)
6  To my knowledge, the two authors who have most brilliantly applied these theories to 
the study of early modern texts have been Alessandro Serpieri and Giuseppina Restivo. 
See Serpieri’s Reading the Signs: Towards a Semiotics of Shakespearean Drama (Serpieri 
1991, translated by K. Elam from the Italian), and Restivo’s Shakespeare between Ma-
chiavelli and Montaigne: An Exploration Through Lotman’s Codes (Restivo 1996). Both 
Italian academics deal with a Lotmanian approach to Shakespeare’s drama.
7  Ben R. Schneider has developed these ideas, in connection with the neo-Stoic revival of 
the early modern period, in a number of texts. See his Shakespeare’s Morals.31
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On the other hand, the centripetal energy of the paradigmatic model, appear-
ing in the Renaissance and the early modern period, contributes to a centraliza-
tion of power, delegitimizes most teleological explanations of reality and intro-
duces the economic and material nexus as the foundation of human relations. 
This means that meaning will be relative, and made dependent on the relations 
established among individuals, ideas and objects. For Lotman, “The meaning 
of a man or of a phenomenon was determined not by its relationship with their 
essences at another level but by its insertion into a given level” (ib.). This trans-
formation is eventually based on the ideological and material (economic mainly) 
changes taking place in England or Spain, and which were described some de-
cades ago by, for instance, Christopher Hill (1965) and Juan Carlos Rodríguez 
(1990). 
The change of paradigm that Lotman’s model suggests has many deep and 
complex consequences for the notion of honour. Medieval theories of analogy 
attended to the nature of the relations between concepts and words employed, 
and of these, the so-called analogy of imitation “appealed to a relation of like-
ness between God and creatures. Creatures are called good or just because their 
goodness or justice imitates or reflects the goodness or justice of God” (SEP 
2012). Indeed, according to Lotman’s typology of culture, during the Middle 
Ages “the world of history received its legitimation from its correspondence 
to the eternal world of symbolic reality” (Restivo 1996: 45). This constant de-
pendence on a higher level of reality characterized late medieval honour: no 
fixed loyalty to ‘earthly’ superiors existed, and this meant the predominance 
of competitive assertiveness and a strong emphasis on the man of honour’s au-
tonomy, which prevented unconditional obedience and, evidently, produced 
dissidence. Significantly, this medieval cultural episteme fostered two central 
features of medieval honour, namely ‘prowesse’ and steadfastness: the former, 
from Anglo-Norman pruesce, according to the Oxford English Dictionary was 
“[a]n act of bravery; a valiant deed; a daring feat or exploit”, and also “[v]alour, 
bravery, gallantry, martial daring; manly courage, fortitude.” Evidently no in-
tellectual value was involved, and only secondarily we can find an ethical com-
ponent. The latter, steadfastness, focused exclusively on the spirit with which 
events were encountered, not on the success or failure of the actions under-
taken. In other words, paradigmatic or symbolic relations involve the constant 
appeal to a higher validating entity, and this implies that honour does not es-
tablish any meaningful relation with, or submit to, any other earthly authority, 
as it is self-validating, autonomous and ‘radically’ (in the double meaning of 
‘going to the root’ and ‘subversively’) independent. It is against this spirit of au-
tonomy verging on dissidence and against this unawareness of the existence of 
any form of central authority to which individuals should be subordinated, that 32
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we may contrast the emergent early modern cultural mode, which will produce 
a syntagmatic type of honour.
The first consequence of this clash of epistemological values involving the 
nature and meaning of honour can be found in connection with the origins, 
or sources, of honour. Medieval symbolic honour was based, like Greek and 
Roman honour, on lineage, or blood, which all through the medieval and early 
modern periods was a powerful signifier. This version of honour, ‘honour by 
nature’, was sustained through writings by Raymond Lull’s Book of the Order of 
Chivalry (1276, translated into English in 1484), in which he writes about “no-
blesse of heart”; or more specifically by the Book of Saint Albans (1486), a trea-
tise that, while dealing with the life of a gentleman (focusing on his pastimes: 
hunting or hawking), introduced an elaborate reflection on gentility, which 
could be ‘of blood’ and ‘granted’. On the other hand, early modern writings 
on honour progressively replace this old medieval sense of honour and line-
age with the so-called Bartolan view (after Bartolo de Saxoferrato), an early 
modern approach to the writings of this Italian lawyer which introduced a 
meritocratic perspective on honour, one that put the emphasis not on nature, 
or blood/heart, but upon nurture, that is, the importance of learning and vir-
tue (James 1978: 310–315). Thus, James Cleland in his Institution of a Young 
Noble Man (1627) refers to the evidence that “betweene our birth and burial, wee 
are over-runne by our betters, and of necessitie must needes confesse that some 
excell & are more noble then others” (ib. 3), in order to introduce a distinction 
between “Natural Nobilitie” (honour by nature, blood, or lineage) and “Personal 
or Inherent Nobilitie” (honour by nurture: acquired through virtue, prowess, and 
learning) (ib. 3–6).
According to Giuseppina Restivo, in her acute Lotmanian analysis of 
Shakespeare, Machiavelli and Montaigne, “the syntagmatic code of the Re-
naissance overturns the preceding point of view” (Restivo 1996: 45). Follow-
ing Lotman, she concludes that in this period “no longer split between actual 
facts and a transcendent symbolic meaning, reality is now referred upon one 
central structure, common to all” (ib.). This emergent, syntagmatic, concept of 
honour is, as we have seen, relational, and this implies that it rejects the subver-
sive individualism of the medieval man of honour, who did whatever his con-
science told him that was right, unaware of axiological, intellectual, or political 
constraints, according to a principle of conduct that resided somewhere else. 
Consequently, this syntagmatic code also emphasizes the virtue of conform-
ism, rejects the private, uncontrolled use of violence of the previous residual 
medieval sense of honour, and, as well as being centralized in the figures of 
the monarch and God, eventually introduces a concern with learning (which 
replaces medieval ‘prowesse’) and success (instead of steadfastness). Thomas 33
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Elyot, who was writing in order to sustain this emergent concept of honour, 
was also aware of how difficult it was going to be to get rid of the residual para-
digmatic one; in his Boke Named the Gouernour (1531) he explains:
Severitie, Magnanimitie, Constance, Honour, Sapience, Continence. These 
qualities [...] do expresse or sette out the figure of very nobilitie; whiche in 
the higher astate it is contained, the more excellent is the vertue in estimation. 
(1531: 95)
The man of honour of the early modern period had to cope with an old, medi-
eval, syntagmatic code, and with the tensions of a new, paradigmatic, one. In-
deed, as I suggested above, there existed a residual paradigmatic sense of hon-
our which still emphasized the importance of steadfastness and prowess, and 
which insisted on the preeminence of blood and lineage, whereas the emergent 
syntagmatic one introduced success, “Sapience” or learning, “Continence” or 
abstaining from behaving in an uncontrolled way, and political allegiance to a 
centralized state. That these two notions of honour were confronting each other, 
and this constituted the dominant cultural form in the sixteenth century, can 
be perceived in Elyot’s uncomfortable balance of syntagmatic and paradigmat-
ic versions of honour: for him “glorie [is] whiche euery noble hart desireth” 
(Elyot 1531: 238), and magnanimity is “an excellencie of mynde concernynge 
thynges of great importaunce or estimation, doynge all thynge that is vertuous 
for the achieuinge of honour.” (Ib. 239) Here, Elyot seems to be recurring to an 
earlier version of honour, one which seems to trust the individual aspiration to 
his own form of virtue. 
A strong advocate of early modern honour, the Elizabethan essayist and 
polyglot Robert Ashley, in his treatise Of Honour (1600), strongly influenced 
by Spanish and Italian writings on this subject, emphasizes this new relational 
and centralized – moralized in some way – role of honour, which he sees, in a 
typically early modern, syntagmatic, fashion, as the cement of the community:
by honour are Cities kept, famelies preserved, the society of men quietly and 
peaceably continued, the common wealth defended [without honour] Mag-
nanimitie will perish, fortitude, moderacion, and decencie will decay, the ob-
servaunce of lawes and lawes themselves wilbe neglected, offyces of honour 
despised, magistrates contemned, discordes arise amongst Cittizens, and eve-
ry one dare to do each foule and wicked deed. (Ashley 1947: 30)34
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However, Ashley’s relational approach to honour is – following Aristotle – aris-
tocratic, or elitist, as it can be clearly perceived in his distinction between glory 
and honour:
yt ys of glorie when any mans name ys magnified amongst many and ys much 
spoken of in euery bodyes mouth as renowned and very rare. Honour on the 
contrary being content with the ample approbacion of the better sort. (Ib. 36)
The new early modern concern with learning, which as we saw replaced me-
dieval emphasis on prowess, and according to Mervyn James was introduced 
by the late sixteenth century grammar school and the advent of Puritanism in 
England (1978: 338–339), finds its place in Ashley’s Elizabethan approach to 
the various ways to attain honour, in which the typically medieval values of 
violence or assertiveness can no longer be found:
vertue, excellencie of mind, witt, learning, knowledge of many thinges, experi-
ence, age, riches, nobilitie, freindes, Clyentes, favour and all the rest which are 
termed goodes either of the mind, of the bodie, or of fortune. (Ib. 55)
But it is in this text where we can most clearly find how Ashley’s sense of hon-
our has internalized the Lotmanian syntagmatic, relational, features of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, by emphasizing how honour has ceased to 
be the realm of the single autonomous individual and now completely depends 
on others:
Therefore neither to be praysed, nor to be reverenced, nor to be esteemed ys for 
yt self to be desired; but that we may behold the Testymonie which good men 
and wise haue geven of our vertue and be delighted therwith, as hauing not so 
much confidence in our selves herein as in the iudgement of others. (Ib. 59)
Almost thirty years later, James Cleland insisted on this same relational char-
acteristic of honour in his Institution of a Young Noble Man (1627):35
A Lotmanian Approach to the Ideological Function of Honour in Early Modern English Texts 
it is not in his hand who is honoured, but in the hearts and opinion of other 
men, who either haue seene his merits, or heard of his renowne, and good repu-
tation, albeit they be distant manie thousand miles from him (Cleland 1627: 
179). 
Recourse to private violence was, as we saw, one of the major changes that hon-
our had to undergo in order to adapt to the new code of culture characteristic 
of the early modern period. No longer legitimized to provide moral reinforce-
ment to a politics of violence (James 1978: 309), honour starts now to actively 
discredit the aggressive behaviour traditionally associated with medieval hon-
our. Thomas Elyot’s writing proves to be especially effective in attacking the 
uncontrollably violent medieval man of honour: 
(F)or who, beholdynge a man in estimation of nobilitie and wisedom by furie 
chaunged in to an horrible figure, his face infarced with rancour, his mouthe 
foule and imbosed, his eien wyde starynge and sparklynge like fire, nat spa-
kyng, but as a wylde bulle, rorying and brayienge out wordes despitefull and 
venomous; forgetynge his astate or condition, forgeting lernyng, ye forgetynge 
all reason, wyll nat haue suche a passion in extreme detestation? (Elyot 1531: 
136)
Elyot even disqualifies an excessive love of honour by defining it as – follow-
ing Cicero – a pernicious vice, which he identifies with ambition: “The more 
higher of courage that a man is, and desirous of glorie, the soner is he meued to 
do thinges agayne right” (ib. 245). Likewise, Lodowycke Bryskett, in A Discourse 
of Civill Life (1606, probably written two decades earlier) also criticizes this same 
attitude: ambition has ceased to be a distinguishing feature of a chivalrous at-
titude, to be condemned as an indignity, and it is disqualified for lacking reason 
and unleashing violence, features that had never been paid any attention to by the 
anti-intellectual tradition of medieval honour:
the disordinate appetites, unreasonable anger, ambitions, greedy desires of 
wealth, of honour, wanton lusts of the flesh, and such other affections spoken 
of before, which have their naturall rootes in those two baser parts of the soule 
devoyde of reason (Bryskett 1606: 89). 36
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However, Bryskett’s text also introduces a considerable amount of ambiguity, 
as he finds himself in the middle of the epistemological clash between emer-
gent (syntagmatic) and residual (paradigmatic) types of honour; so he simul-
taneously criticizes, as we have seen, “unreasonable anger” while he advises to 
revenge when given the lie: 
he that receiveth it, standeth so charged in his honor and reputation, that he 
cannot disburden himselfe of that imputation, but by striking of him that hath 
so given it, or by chalenging him the combat (ib. 50). 
But, also by Bryskett: “Duellum is a foolish custom and wicked act” (ib. 51). This 
contradiction has been perceived by some scholars, like Chris Boswell, who 
claims that Bryskett’s Discovrse is at times self-contradictory on the subject of 
reprisal, since “contrary to what he claims about the dishonour and wickedness 
of retaliation, he also argues that it is imperative to be aggressively proactive 
in defence of one’s good name” (Boswell 2003: 42). Furthermore, this conflict 
within Bryskett’s text can be also found in his emphasis on nominalism, or in 
the contradictory connections that he appears to perceive between physical ap-
pearance and virtue (Boswell 2003: 27, 30).
A centralized sense of honour follows, as we saw, from a syntagmatic ap-
proach to reality, which is no longer split between facts and transcendence, and 
consequently James Cleland makes explicit, already in the Stuart period, the 
now obvious subordination of honour to the king, who, as a typical feature of 
providentialist belief, can dishonour his subjects at will:
If wee should suffer our selves to be dishonoured by anie whosoeuer, except 
it bee by his Maiestie, who maie dispose of our liues at his pleasure, our state 
were miserable (Cleland 1627: 235).
Indeed, service to the prince is for Cleland as important as honour itself, and to 
the service of the monarch should be subordinated that residual notion, prow-
ess, now defined not as a quality of the individual in his personal quest for glory 
but as “an habitud of the minde, wherby a man is resolved to hazard himselfe 
unto al perils & paines for the good of his Prince, Countrie, and for his owne 
honour, aduisedlie” (ib. 230). By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the 
total submission of the reputation of a knight to the general welfare, symbolized 
by the service to the king and an orderly life, had been completely accepted by 37
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the aristocracy, who after the Restoration had abandoned all thoughts of dis-
sident honour. Thus, the 1711 epitaph of Sir Robert Atkyns of Gloucestershire, 
who had been knighted by Charles II in 1663, manifests the already dominant 
culture of honour, with no mention of glory, prowess or steadfastness: “He was 
always loyal to his Prince, loving to his wife, faithful to his friends, charitable to 
the poor, kind and courteous to his neighbours, just to all, sober and serious in 
his conversation and a peacemaker to the uttermost of his powers.” (Simmons 
1978: 63)
Thomas Hobbes had already warned against the artificial nature of (sym-
bolic) honour, which he considered but a consequence of power, and a relative 
(and relational), not absolute, value within a centralized political system. In the 
tenth chapter of his Leviathan (1651) (“Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and 
Worthiness”) Hobbes explains:
The value, or worth, of a man is, as of all other things, his price; that is to say, so 
much as would be given for the use of his power; and therefore is not absolute, 
but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another. (Hobbes 1999: 
X, 54–55).
Just like he distinguishes between natural and instrumental powers (1999: X, 
53), Hobbes also differentiates between ‘natural ways of honouring’ and ‘other 
honours’ (that is, those derived from the Commonwealth, or institutionalized 
power). But whatever their origin, function or essence, all honour, reputation 
or dignity is never an absolute but a relative thing and, what is even of more 
relevance, the actual content of the action, its relation with a meaning that may 
be ascribed to it, is of no relevance, as honour has no longer any autonomous 
entity and now depends entirely on the power of the monarch:
    Nor does it alter the case of honour whether an action (so it be great and dif-
ficult, and consequently a sign of much power) be just or unjust: for honour 
consisteth only in the opinion of power (Hobbes 1999: 58).38
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Conclusion
The concept of honour is one central concern of early modern essayists and, as 
some scholars have already shown, of much early modern poetry and drama.8 
In the previous pages I have attempted to provide a succinct examination of the 
evolution of the notion of honour as presented by sixteenth and seventeenth 
century texts dealing with moral and political issues, and more specifically 
with honour as an axiological and ideological concept. That there is a conflict 
between two versions of honour had already been suggested by some authors 
(see for example Anita Pacheco’s Shakespeare and the Contradictions of Honour, 
Pacheco 1990): as I have already explained, the early modern subject had to 
deal with a medieval code of honour which coexisted side by side with a new, 
early modern, one, which produced contradiction and conflict. But it is only 
thorough Yuri Lotman’s semiotic model explaining what he called the ‘typol-
ogy of cultures,’ mediated by Raymond Williams’ perception of the residual, 
emergent and dominant forms of culture, that we can account for the radical 
transformation that honour experiences in the transition between the Middle 
Ages and the early modern period. Much of the conflictive nature of the hon-
our of the seventeenth century can only be apprehended by making reference 
to this model, which accounts for the decline of oaths and promises, lineage 
and prowess, steadfastness and independence, and explains the rise of submis-
sion and centralization, subordination to the monarch and relativity of certain 
values, and the notion of honour as the external, royal ‘reward of virtue.’
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